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33° DISCUSSION
points of view of the two previous chapters to bear upon the question
of valuation in the individual and the human species. In Chapter 5,
on Morality as Value, through a statement and criticism of the systems
of morality the author prepares the way for the presentation of his
own constructive view which he denominates 'egocentric rigorism.'
In this system, conscience is the supreme value, not however as an
end in itself, but as an instrument of realization. It has both an
individual and a social function. In this way he is able to deny that
there exist freak consciences (Sondergewissen) and hence a morality
outside of the moral community. He recognizes, however, that the
human life of the individual is much richer than any system of
morality however complete, so that there is room in the moral life
no less for men of action like Bismarck, than for men of principle
like Kant.
The book may be recommended as a particularly pleasing con-
tribution to the discussion of ethical problems. It is written in a
style that places no unnecessary obstacles in the way of the foreigner,
and the notes to the chapters, which have been grouped together
at the end of the book, are particularly rich in bibliographical material.
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DISCUSSION
THE UNCONSCIOUS BIAS OF LABORATORIES
In my recently published review and critique of the work centering
about the problem of the content of thought,11 have attempted to
show that the failure of certain investigators to discover imageless
factors might be attributed to "a predisposition on the part of the
'trained' observer which is decidedly prejudicial to the discovery of
meanings in experience." This point I have illustrated, in a striking
manner, as I thought, by reference to the analyses of conscious
attitudes made by Miss Clarke. Miss Clarke's subjects, I have said,
"lay all stress on the sensory factors in their experiences, and when-
ever meaning factors appear, they are either passed over by the
author, or referred to as Kundgabe. It is interesting to note, however,
that in the analyses given of some sixty attitudes such as approval,
caution, difficulty, surprise, etc., there appear several which, as
named, clearly involve an element of knowing. For instance, the
'Cf. this journal, 8, 183-197.
THE UNCONSCIOUS BIAS OF LABORATORIES 331
'consciousness that the letter was too small,' 'fear that I had reacted
too quickly,' ' I ought to know that,' etc. Yet each of these is un-
blushingly analyzed into 'muscular strain and organic sensation,'
'slight sinking of the stomach and diaphragm,' and the like."1
My attention has been called to the use of 'unblushingly' as
seeming to impute dishonesty on the part of Miss Clarke in handling
her data. This has surprised me greatly, for I had no thought that
the 'predisposition' of which I accused Miss Clarke and others should
be interpreted otherwise than as an unconscious determining tendency
which led always to the discovery of sensations and never to the
discovery of thoughts.
It is my belief that when one is predisposed to the discovery of
meanings, sensations become secondary phenomena, and when one is
predisposed to the analysis of sensations, meanings are not focal.
It is impossible, I think, that both should be focal at the same time,
hence the discrepancy in the results of two sets of investigators each
working on the same problem but with fundamentally different biases.
The average 'trained' observer of our laboratories is one whose train-
ing has consisted in manifold analyses of sensation and images.
These are the things for which he will naturally look, and without a
counter suggestion, these are the only factors which his analysis may
be expected to reveal.
1 wish publicly to disclaim any intention of accusing the Cornell
investigators or those of any other laboratory of wilful distortion of
the data which they have obtained. Furthermore, I have never
harbored the thought that undue influence was exerted on these
investigators by the attitudes and beliefs of the directors of these
laboratories. But surely, in problems as delicate as these, it is not
overt acts on the part of director, investigator or observer with which
we have to deal, but rather with attitudes which unconsciously per-
vade the laboratories and bias accordingly the work which is done
there. I doubt if any laboratory can be entirely free of such a
prejudice. I have taken pains in my review to call attention to at
least two instances in the work of Binet and Moore, respectively,2
in which a predisposition favorable to the imageless content has, I
believe, led the authors to conclusions which the data do not un-
equivocally support.
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